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- The next round of Supreme Court forecastsby SCOTUSblog Staff on November 21, 2026 at 4:55 am
Following Thanksgiving weekend, the court’s third session of oral arguments for the 2026-27 term will begin (on Monday, November 30, to be exact). This will include some of the biggest cases of the term, including Viramontes v. Cook County (which we will be liveblogging), Jouppi v. Alaska, and Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D.To remind you, in collaboration with Good Judgment Inc., we are giving SCOTUS obsessives (and non-obsessives) a way to forecast how the court will decide the most important cases of the term, and to test that collective judgment against AI models. In July, we will provide the names on SCOTUSblog of the three most accurate forecasters, reward them with merch, and compare their forecasts to those of the machines.Here are the two featured cases argued in the October session, which you can still make forecasts on (right up until decision day):St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy (argued on November 3): Will the Supreme Court rule that the Universal Preschool Program is subject to strict scrutiny as to any parishes’ free exercise clause claims against the state? Currently, 81.75% of forecasters say yes; 18.25% say no.Nielsen v. Watanabe (argued on November 9): Will the Supreme Court rule that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit erred in recognizing Watanabe’s cause of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics? Currently, 81.26% of forecasters say yes; 18.74% say no.As for the upcoming argument session, you can provide forecasts for the following cases:Jouppi v. Alaska (to be argued on Monday, November 1): Will the Supreme Court rule that the ordered forfeiture of Kenneth Jouppi's airplane for transporting beer to a “dry village” violated the Eighth and 14th Amendments’ bar against excessive fines?Viramontes v. Cook County (to be argued on Wednesday, December 2): Will the Supreme Court rule that either the Cook County, Illinois, ordinance or Connecticut statutes banning or severely restricting the possession of AR-15 platforms and similar semiautomatic rifles violate the Second and 14th Amendments?International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson (to be argued on Monday, December 7): Will the Supreme Court rule that the petitioners (parents and/or organizations) may have standing to challenge Washington state laws that the parents contend may displace them from making decisions about the raising of their children with regard to “gender transitions”?Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota (to be argued on Tuesday, December 8): Will the Supreme Court rule that Arizona may require voter-registration applicants to produce “satisfactory evidence” of U.S. citizenship when registering with a state registration form?Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D. (to be argued on Wednesday, Dec. 9): Will the Supreme Court rule that DHS’ policies governing “third-country removals” violate the Constitution or federal law?Grand v. City of University Heights (to be argued on Wednesday, Dec. 9): Will the Supreme Court rule that Daniel Grand’s case against the city over its requirements for a special use permit to host religious events at his home may proceed?To make a forecast, simply visit https://www.gjopen.com/users/sign_up. You only need a working email address, Google account, or Facebook account to do so. Once you sign up, you will be automatically directed to the SCOTUSblog 2026-27 Supreme Court Forecasting Challenge page, where you will be asked to choose the likelihood that each case will be decided one way or the other.As further significant cases are granted, we will add them to the page.
- Criminal law is constitutional lawby Rory Little on November 20, 2026 at 3:00 pm
With arguments over the Second Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause on the near horizon, this column seeks to provide some tranquil and more generalized ideas – a moment of Thanksgiving holiday respite. Whether you are a Supreme Court follower who usually shunts criminal law to the side, or an experienced criminal law reader who might enjoy some holiday dinner thoughts for your friends and family, this column seeks to demonstrate that much of criminal law is actually constitutional law – and perhaps show why that can be so interesting. To do so, I will scatter some examples from last term, drawn from my recently published Annual Review of the Supreme Court’s Term, Criminal Cases booklet. When explaining criminal law to your friends or just opining over Thanksgiving dinner, I’d like to show why your mantra should be “crim law is con law” and vice versa.Winship – criminal law fundamentals are constitutional lawEvery criminal law class I have taught over 40 years, from 1L first semester through advanced criminal procedure or federal criminal law, has begun with the same case: 1970’s In re Winship. Even non-lawyers know from film and TV that the prosecution’s high burden for proof in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt. But do they know that this is constitutionally required? And perhaps more interesting, that this standard is nowhere, textually, in that document?“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,” wrote Justice William Brennan Jr. for the Winship court. If only all Supreme Court decisions had such clear and succinct rule statements.But why is this the rule? It is not found either in the body of the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights, which was adopted soon after the Constitution and focused largely on criminal law protections. Winship‘s answer: because that standard “dates back at least from our early years as a Nation,” “[i]t is now accepted in common law jurisdictions,” it is expressed “in many opinions of this Court,” and it has “long been assumed” to be “constitutionally required.” Thus history, tradition, and precedent support it. Perhaps most fundamentally, a high standard of proof, harder to satisfy than in civil law cases, is essential to fundamental fairness for the public as well as individuals charged with crimes. It is “indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community” as well as “every individual” exposed to imprisonment. Or, as Justice John Harlan II wrote in an influential concurrence, this standard is “bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”Thus, a fundamental premise of criminal law, Winship, is constitutional law too. Moreover, and just by the way, Winship demonstrates that the “incorporation” theory of the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause (that is, applying the Bill of Rights to the states) is not limited to concepts stated expressly in the Bill of Rights itself – as “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is not. Critics of non-textual constitutional rights – like privacy, a right to travel, a right to refuse medical treatment (like mask wearing?), or even a right to terminate a pregnancy – must confront the application of their literalist theory to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, too. For this reason, I also teach Winship in every constitutional law class.There are almost no crimes mentioned in the ConstitutionThis sometimes surprises 1L students (and others). But the goal of the Constitution was to (re)describe a system of government, and form “a more perfect Union” after the prior Articles of Confederation had proved unsatisfactory. It was not to write a criminal code. The states were then (and still are) the primary forum for criminal law.So the Constitution defines only one crime, treason (in Article III, section 3). It mentions a few others, like “Bribery” (in Article II, section 4) and “Breach of the Peace” with a general reference to “Felony” (in Article I, section 6). And of course the Impeachment Clause (Article II section 4) mentions “high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” without definition. Again, states were expected to take care of the substantive definition and application of virtually all criminal law. (However, as I explained some years ago, the First Congress in 1790 did enact over two dozen federal crimes.)Yet a large focus of the Bill of Rights is criminal procedureThree years after the Constitution was drafted, the Bill of Rights focused on criminal law rights in at least four proposed amendments (the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth). I won’t list the multitude of rights captured there, but they form the bulk of all criminal procedure law school classes today. The right to be free from unreasonable governmental searches and compelled self-incrimination, and the rights to counsel, jury trials, and no cruel and unusual punishments – and much more – are all embodied in the Bill of Rights.One example from last term: in Villareal v. Texas, the court had to interpret the Sixth Amendment right to “Assistance of Counsel” to decide (unanimously) that a criminal trial judge can order that the defendant not discuss their ongoing testimony with their attorney during an overnight recess.Why was the Bill of Rights so focused on criminal procedure rights? It’s a fun question to ask students, or at the Thanksgiving table if things get slow. Sooner or later someone gives the soundbite answer: “because most of the constitution’s framers were crooks.” They were certainly guilty of treason – then and still today a capital (that is, death penalty) offense, as well as other crimes (violence, destruction of property, incitement, and more). Had the revolutionary Framers been captured by the government (the British) they likely would have been hung. Instead, during the course of the revolution, numbers had been tried in absentia, found guilty by officials (not juries), and had their houses searched and occupied by troops. Cruel and unusual torture had been inflicted on some captured compatriots. When constitutional ratifying conventions demanded a bill of rights, protections from unfair criminal processes were therefore topmost on the minds of many drafters (if not perhaps “the People” at the time).(Another aside: ask your lawyer friends to compare the content of civil procedure versus criminal procedure classes today. The latter full-semester course is almost entirely constitutional law – I used to call my own crim pro class “Con Law Three.” By contrast, civil procedure classes, also a full semester, focus largely on the nitty-gritty details of federal rules, only occasionally wandering into statutes or the Constitution.)In addition to the four explicitly criminal-focused amendments, you might then add general constitutional ideas that are bound to capture some criminal law cases: the First, Second, Third, and Ninth Amendments. The First Amendment’s direction, that “Congress shall make no law” regarding (“respecting”) or abridging freedoms of religion, speech, and the press, is a constitutional law command against criminal laws as well as civil. So too is a protection of a right to keep and bear arms, and to not have government troops quartered in “any” house (not just your own).And then consider the “great generalities” of the ConstitutionIn his 1921 Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School (subsequently published as “The Nature of the Judicial Process”), future Supreme Court Justice (and then New York Court of Appeals Judge) Benjamin Cardozo discussed “the great generalities of the Constitution.” Among these, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 14th Amendment are huge sources of criminal law doctrine. Just last term, for example, the procedural steps required to apply the Equal Protection Clause against racial (and other) bias in jury selection, and the idea that due process and judicial integrity requires a “miscarriage of justice” exception to guilty plea waivers, received focused Supreme Court attention (in Pitchford v. Cain and Hunter v. United States, respectively).Criminal law cases focused on the meaning and application of these broad constitutional requirements arise regularly almost every Supreme Court term. Indeed, as I advise my students every year (again I aspire to teach with a smile, not didactic cynicism): no matter what arguments you make on the defense side of a criminal case, always add the words “and in violation of due process” to preserve at least a thread of a constitutional argument that you may not even perceive at the moment.In addition to equal protection and due process, I (and others) would add the Ninth Amendment, which speaks of unspecified “rights … retained by the people.” Justices have sometimes suggested that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments state nothing but “truism[s],” while other Supreme Court decisions have relied (at least in part) on the Ninth. For some, invocation of the Ninth Amendment may provoke if not laughter (it having been referred to by one academic as a “constitutional jester”), then a distinctly conservative or “originalist” rejection. Yet other conservative scholars such as John Yoo and Calvin Massey (my late former colleague) have written expansively about it. As Randy Barnett has argued, the Ninth Amendment “means what it says,” and is “a significant guarantee of individual liberty.” If that is so, then it is (or could be) another source of criminal law protection for criminal defendants.For example, Griswold v. Connecticut recognized a constitutional right to privacy in the criminal law context, resting in part (and almost entirely for three justices) on the Ninth Amendment. Less controversially, perhaps, Chief Justice Warren Burger later invoked the amendment in the 1980 case of Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia to support an “unarticulated” constitutional right for the public (and the press) to attend criminal trials. And in 2000, even Justice Antonin Scalia agreed (in a solo dissent to Troxel v. Granville, a non-criminal case) that the Ninth Amendment recognizes unenumerated rights. When you tell your Thanksgiving dinner companions that criminal law is constitutional law, don’t forget the Ninth Amendment.So criminal law is, very often, constitutional lawThus it should be unsurprising (as detailed in my Annual Review of the Supreme Court’s Term, Criminal Law booklet) that 22 of the court’s merits decisions last term that address criminal law involved elements of constitutional law (17 fully argued cases plus five summary (unargued) decisions). That’s a substantial percentage of the court’s entire merits opinions docket, roughly a quarter or more.Statutory criminal law cases also often involve constitutional lawBy now I hope that you are persuaded: criminal law is (often) constitutional law. “But wait – there’s more!” When you combine the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause with the oft-cited judicial doctrine of constitutional avoidance, criminal cases requiring statutory interpretation also fall into this category. That is, these are criminal law cases that involve consideration of constitutional law. Advocates in statutory cases often raise potential constitutional objections to a criminal statute or to its application in their case, or they may raise constitutional law ideas in favor of their preferred interpretation. In addition, an understanding of constitutional doctrine can be necessary to properly evaluate the merits of a statutory claim. The bottom line is that, in many statutory criminal cases, explication or consideration of constitutional law is necessary or helpful to explain the result.Just a few examples from last term: In Barrett v. United States, the court had to mine the details of double jeopardy doctrine to agree, unanimously, that a statute could be interpreted as not permitting two convictions for a single act, thereby avoiding a constitutional problem. In Olivier v. City of Brandon, the court had to examine Olivier’s constitutional claims in order to decide whether the federal civil rights statutes were a proper vehicle for him to sue under. And in Whitton v. Dixon, the court had to briefly explain the constitutional Giglio doctrine, regarding a prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory impeachment information, to reverse an application of the federal habeas corpus statue.Immigration cases also often require constitutional law, either to dispose of the merits or to resolve statutory issues in them. Last term’s birthright citizenship case, Trump v. Barbara, is the most obvious example. Because immigration and criminal law cases are often intertwined – consider recent ICE arrests, detentions, and criminal violation grounds for removal – I include them in my annual review as well as the purview of this column. And even civil cases that I consider related to criminal law often require consideration of constitutional law concepts. For example, last term’s Hencely v. Fluor Corp., rejecting a claim of government contractor immunity, required consideration of constitutional preemption doctrine.In other words, criminal law mixed with constitutional law is everywhere.Conclusion: Happy ThanksgivingLast week, many of us were focused on the details of elections around the country, big and small. And next week, after Thanksgiving, will be chock full of criminal law and related Supreme Court oral arguments. So I’ve tried to give you a break today, and provide a few thoughts that are, perhaps, entertaining, or provocative, or at least interesting ways to navigate your mealtime gatherings (rather than focusing on the usual subjects). For some of you, perhaps this column has simply demonstrated what you already considered obvious; or perhaps it has opened interesting linkages in your mind between constitutional law and criminal law. In any case, thanks for reading this far. Next week I hope you are fortunate enough to breathe relaxing breaths, give thanks, and dwell not on legal minutiae but on what really matters.
- Even justices have regretsby Nora Collins on November 20, 2026 at 2:30 pm
In June 2023, the court decided Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina, holding that race-conscious admissions at Harvard and the University of North Carolina violated the Constitution. Chief Justice John Roberts’ majority opinion in the case, along with Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s concurrence, cited Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 2003 prediction in Grutter v. Bollinger that “25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further” student body diversity.But the justices did not account for one thing, according to Brooklyn Law School Professor Yuvraj Joshi: O’Connor’s later misgivings about that statement. In interviews with her biographer after she left the court, O’Connor acknowledged that the 25-year figure “may have been a misjudgment.” When asked for a new estimate, she replied, “[t]here’s no timetable. You just don’t know.”
- Trump administration brings climate grant dispute to SCOTUSby Kelsey Dallas, Nora Collins on November 20, 2026 at 2:00 pm
But the administration withdrew an interim docket request.
- Trump administration withdraws application to Supreme Court to block lower court ruling on protected status for Venezuelan nationalsby Amy Howe on November 19, 2026 at 9:35 pm
Originally published on Nov. 18; updated with latest developments on Nov. 19 at 4:35 p.m. The battle over the Temporary Protected Status program – which allows foreign nationals to remain in the United States and work here when they cannot safely return home – returned to the Supreme Court on Wednesday afternoon. Specifically, the Trump administration asked the justices to block a September 2025 ruling by a federal judge in San Francisco that kept the program in place for Venezuelan nationals. U.S. Solicitor General D. John Sauer told the court that if they do not act, the order by U.S. District Judge Edward Chen “will spring into effect, inflicting severe and immediate harm.”Then-DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas designated Venezuela for the TPS program in 2021 and again in 2023. In 2025, he announced that the program would be extended through October 2026. Mayorkas cited a “severe humanitarian emergency” resulting from the “severe political and economic crisis” in Venezuela as the reason for the designation.After Mayorkas’ successor, Kristi Noem, announced her decisions to end Venezuela’s designation and its subsequent extension, a group representing TPS holders went to federal court in San Francisco to challenge those decisions. Chen set them aside, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld that ruling. In 2025, while that litigation was moving forward, the Supreme Court paused Chen’s order with regard to Venezuela, effectively clearing the way for the Trump administration to deport Venezuelan TPS beneficiaries while the case continued.In June 2026, in Mullin v. Doe, the Supreme Court ruled – in a pair of cases involving Haitian and Syrian TPS beneficiaries – that courts generally cannot review the Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision to designate or terminate a country under the TPS program. Relying on that decision, the Trump administration asked the court to send the Venezuelan TPS case back to the 9th Circuit for another look, which the court did in October of this year.When the case returned to the 9th Circuit, Sauer told the justices, and the Supreme Court’s initial stay of Chen’s ruling expired, the court of appeals entered an administrative stay, which is due to expire on Nov. 20. “Absent judicial intervention between now and” then, Sauer wrote, “the Department of Homeland Security will have to resurrect TPS status for hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans after a nineteen-month hiatus.” Indeed, he noted, his office “has been informed that the government could be forced to immediately release into the country some 1800 or so Venezuelan aliens from detention.” And all of this would result, he continued, even though the Supreme Court has already “conclusively held in Doe” that the TPS statute bars courts from reviewing the DHS secretary’s decision to designate or end the designation of TPS.On Thursday, the Trump administration withdrew its application. In a letter to Scott Harris, the clerk of the Supreme Court, Sauer explained that “a few hours after we filed our stay application, the court of appeals issued an order” extending its current administrative stay (and therefore keeping Chen’s ruling on hold) until seven days after it issues a decision. “Should the Ninth Circuit enter an adverse judgment,” Sauer added, “we intend to immediately return to this Court for additional relief.”





